The Dynamics of States

The Formation and Crises of State Domination

Edited by

KLAUS SCHLICHTE
Humboldt University at Berlin, Germany

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
The dynamics of states : the formation and crises of state domination
1. Authoritarianism 2. State, The 3. Developing countries - Politics and government
I. Schlichte, Klaus
321.9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The dynamics of states : the formation and crises of state domination / edited by Klaus Schlichte.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7546-4504-5
1. State, The--Case studies. 2. Comparative government. I. Schlichte, Klaus.

JC11.D93 2005
320.9172'4--dc22

2005007436

ISBN 9780754645047 (hbk)
ISBN 9781138266858 (pbk)

Transferred to Digital Printing in 2014

Chapter 1

Rethinking the State

Joel S. Migdal and Klaus Schlichte

Powerful forces during the tumultuous last quarter of the twentieth century buffeted states, leading to widespread, transformative crises in them. From members of the European Union facing daily challenges to their local officials' accepted prerogatives, to victims of rapid withdrawal of foreign investments in East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Russia, to the targets of brutal civil wars in Africa, states faced covert and overt challenges to their power. Rapidly increasing capital flows; unprecedented levels of debt; new information technologies; growing trade and the formation of trade blocs; heightened activity by international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, in the domestic affairs of states; wildly fluctuating commodity prices, especially for the most important of all commodities, oil; and the new power alignments spawned by the end of the Cold War were among the potent forces that strained existing governing institutions. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and several other states were territorially disintegrating; entire regimes in other East European countries were collapsing; and formal political institutions in much of Africa seemed to be more the booty of bloody wars than actual governing organizations.

Even as these momentous events brought continuous surprises, scholars continued to stick with their existing understanding of what the state is and how it interacts with its own society and outside forces. Dissatisfaction with those old ways of thinking about states in the circumstances of the transformative crisis in the last two decades led to the collaborative project that gave birth to this book.

To be sure, academic divisions abounded in the older models about the future of the state. Some scholars went on championing it, despite all the problems besetting it, as the key institution in people's lives, providing the rules and norms for daily life. Others shifted to predicting its imminent demise, with alternative institutions, both local and transnational, moving in to establish the parameters of everyday life as well as the source for collective identity. Indeed, this divergence over the centrality of the future state became the focus of serious debates in the fields of comparative politics and international relations (see, for example, Krasner 1999: 3).

These debates have spawned a bewildering number of models, theories, and definitions. According to the tradition of German *Staatslehre*, popular in studies of international law, the state is the enigmatic composite of 'state territory, state people and state power' (*Staatsgebiet*, *Staatsvolk und Staatsgewalt*, Jellinek 1920: 394). Others have seen it as the preeminent organization among many other organizations in society. Some political scientists have conceived of the state as part of 'a system of negotiations' (Scharpf 1991: 623). For many economists, the state is the 'multitude of public economic actors' (Stobbe 1983: 2). In the theory of social systems, the state is seen as 'the self-description of the political system', as 'a semantic artifact' (Luhmann 1984: 627). According to neoclassical theory, the state is an 'organization which has a comparative advantage in violence' and is therefore 'in the position to specify and enforce property rights' (North 1981: 21).

For all the divergences in views, most scholars across the social science disciplines have shared key assumptions about how to think about politics and the relations of states and societies. Drawing on Max Weber's ideal-type of the modern rational state, scholars have generally assumed the coherence, integrity, and autonomy of the modern state, and some have made the study of autonomy a cottage industry. They have all started with the state having a fixed set of boundaries and a unified set of rules that circumscribe its realm. These assumptions of the state as the overarching institution have been the bedrock of the study of comparative politics since at least the beginning of the twentieth century. And it is those assumptions that this project aims to question.

The premise of the authors here is that a pervasive, transformative crisis of the state has occurred in recent decades, forcing a reevaluation of existing conceptual models. The following articles suggest an alternative way of thinking about, even of defining, states. Their premise is that actual states' practices have often been fragmented, even contradictory; the institutionalization of the state has been a far cry from that of a centrally controlled organization using a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in order to get its way. If scholars are to understand cases, for example, where military 'units are fighting their own small wars and pursuing their own economic interests',[1] rather than acting as parts of an integrated chain of command, they are going to need new starting assumptions.

Casting Aside Old Assumptions about the State

Existing state theories stumble on cases where the lines between state and society, public and private, formal and informal, and legal and illegal are blurred. Existing theories have been built on these binary opposites and have had difficulty even finding appropriate terms when these binaries have failed to capture the situation on the ground. Australian political scientist, Harold Crouch, reflected the

[1] 'Indonesian Commanders Losing Control of Troops', *New York Times*, 22 August 2000, p. 2.

frustration with existing terms in talking about soldiers in Indonesia who hire themselves out for all sorts of jobs, which are 'illegal, semi-legal, a-legal and occasionally some legal like bodyguards'.[2] Older theories lack the vocabulary to deal with institutionalization of actual states along different lines, without these clear dualities.

Weber was careful to pose his concept of the state as coming out of the modern European experience and did not intend its application for politics outside Europe. But those who have drawn on Weber have often transposed this concept elsewhere for states that have emerged in very different circumstances. Meanwhile, the teleology of the early theories of modernization[3] in which it was assumed that non-Western states would follow the route of European states has proven inadequate in the face of ongoing dynamics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The same has happened with the structural determinism of the dependency school.[4] Functional analyses that interpreted the state simply as the necessary fulfillment of certain ends – again pointing to the underlying unity of different states – similarly failed to anticipate the new and diverse forms of state institutionalization. Theory needs more than negatives – illegal, informal – to capture the variety of new forms.

Partly, the ideal-typical method used by Weber is at the root of these limits. An ideal-type, in the sense Weber conceived this heuristical tool, is an exaggeration, the over-statement of a particular characteristic in order to allow comparisons (Weber 1988: 190). An ideal-type is not itself a hypothesis, but it allows one to build hypotheses on deviations, variations, and totally different forms. Once these differences are noticed, the need for a vocabulary of description and explanation becomes obvious.

The central events of this project, a series of workshops by French, German, and United States scholars examining the decay of centralized governing institutions in non-Western countries, revealed those theoretical and conceptual anomalies and lacunae. Participants found themselves, early in the project, forced to shoe-horn their fascinating findings on Africa, Asia, and Latin America into analytic categories that simply did not fit their cases. In particular, using the standard understanding of the modern state inspired by Weber demanded intellectual contortions and gyrations that constrained imaginative thinking on the subject of decaying or changing-beyond-recognition central organizations and their relationships to their population. In particular, new sorts of alliances between state officials and individuals or groups in society – networks that did not fit well into existing analytical categories – demanded new attention. The institutionalization of these networks, their existence outside the formal laws on the books, and their tendency to ensconce different sets of state officials in conflicting normative and

---

[2] Quoted in Ibid.

[3] Cf. for example the works of David Lerner (1958), David E. Apter (1965) and W.W: Rostow (1960).

[4] Cf. for example the works of Amin (1976), Frank (1969) or the contributions in Senghaas (1972).

behavioural universes, all made it increasingly difficult to simply dismiss what was happening as illegal – as graft or corruption – or as private and informal. It became harder for those looking at their cases to describe what they were finding as simple deviations from the proper norm of what a state is (and should be). This introductory chapter attempts to pinpoint the difficulties with the old assumptions and to suggest an alternative way of imagining the state. It aims, in short, to capture the different view of the bases of statehood underlying the empirical studies presented in the workshops.

The chapter begins with a brief examination of some of these old assumptions found in writings on the state, both of those touting the state's resilience and those pointing to the state's fall from its exalted perch. It then turns to the task of re-imagining the state, starting with a definition in place of Weber's conception. That definition suggests studying the state by looking at a set of dynamics within the state and between state and society. We set out these dynamics in the following section. Finally, we offer some conclusions and ask about the future of the state – the entity that, along with the market, has been the cornerstone in the building of the modern world.

The State as an Autonomous Sphere

This section begins by drawing a composite picture of the state by distilling some common assumptions from diverse writings of social scientists. While the language used in this composite, particularly the emphasis on space and boundaries, is different from that used by many political scientists and others, it does afford a window into some of the underlying assumptions in existing state theories. Scholars looking at state autonomy, drawing on realist and other theories in international relations, have imagined the world as divided into well-insulated political spaces. In existing models of the state, the political boundaries drawn on maps mark not only the endpoints of state jurisdiction; they also set off social systems, rules and norms of daily behaviour, and the bounds of primary collective identity. Boundaries are social, not just physical; phenomena (cf. Ruggie 1993). In these insulated spaces, one complex actor, the state, has been able to differentiate itself from the tangle of other social organizations and their specific interests.

These other organizations, from family and clans to business corporations and churches, have often been grounded in very different imagined configurations of space, whether these have been local, regional, or transnational. The centrality of the concept of autonomy comes in the ability of the state to transcend the power of these other organizations and their interests and re-frame them in terms of the state's territory, which insulated space. It has not so much obliterated other conceptions of the configuration of space as subordinated them to the primary ordering of space, that defined by the state's borders.

Autonomy means that the state is a coherent, fairly unified actor, set apart from, or above, other social organizations. The state's coterie of officials, according to these theories, *en masse* mesh the organizational interests of the state with their

own, particularly its requirement that its boundaries be regarded as the most meaningful shapers of space. Through its officials, the state exhibits its own preferences and has the strength to act on those preferences and to change the behaviour of others. Its sheer power to make others bend to its rules is transformed by its many officials in their bureaus and agencies into an ordered sort of power, what Weber called bureaucratic domination (*bürokratische Herrschaft*) (Weber 1985: 551).

The state generates domination in its designated space through a uniform set of rules on how to behave (formal law, bureaucratic regulations, judicial precedents, customary procedures, and more), backed by the threat and practice of violence, trumping any other rules that might exist. Totalitarian states have set and executed those rules themselves or, frequently through the strong arm of single political parties; in them, the internal space of the state can be thought of as fairly undifferentiated. The tentacles of the party and state apparatus reach uniformly from central literal and figurative sites through the territory, applying a single code in a one-size-fits-all manner.

Liberal and federal states, in contrast, have further differentiated their bounded space. For example, liberal states have allowed for areas where numerous other institutions, such as families and markets, create and execute some rules for daily behaviour and where individuals possess rights, creating seemingly inviolable spaces for certain forms of behaviour (for example, speech, worship, and assembly with others). In federal states, the rules of daily behaviour take on different guises in different sites; a 16-year old in the United States can be licensed to drive in Oregon but not New Jersey. Even in the case of liberal states, however, it is the central state that establishes the parameters for the domain of other organizations, both in terms of area and function, and the permissible types and limits of behaviour for organizations and individuals. Thus, various families may have rules quite different from one another – one in which parents set their children's curfews at 10:00 p.m.; another, at midnight; and a third, in which they set no curfew at all – but no parents can make rules to regularly beat their children. When other organizations violate the state's parameters, as when a family's parents abuse their children or a corporation operates monopolistically, state officials may discipline or even disband the family or the corporation. Whether totalitarian or liberal or something in between, states, from this perspective, exercise supremacy in both establishing the bounds of meaningful space and the kinds of permitted behaviour within their borders.

Most political theories posit the autonomous state as the *sine qua non* for people (its society in that political space) to survive and, if possible, to achieve a modicum of prosperity (cf. Evans and Rauch 1999). Through the sheer physical force at its disposal and, ultimately, through the moral power that it generates as the pre-eminent organization, the state tames or mediates the unruly differences that bring members of society into conflict and threaten their individual and collective survival and well-being. It simultaneously protects them from outside predators and imposes upon them an order, both social and moral, that allows them

to live peaceably with one another. Effective property rights necessary for economies to function are mainstays of that sort of order; so, too, are the codes of other laws and the mediation and stability that an autonomous state can provide. These laws are both firm guidelines for behaviour in various realms – rules in the strictest sense – and symbolic representations (as in reverence for the Law) of the overall collective order.

In U.S. academic literature, the watershed in highlighting the importance of the autonomous state came with the publication of the book, *Bringing the State Back In,* edited by three important figures in American sociology and political science, Evans, Skocpol, and Rueschemeyer (1985).[5] The hoopla surrounding the book as a turning point in academic studies was certainly overdone. Perhaps the word 'state' itself was not analytically present in key works published in the United States in those earlier years before *Bringing the State Back In*; still, conceptions of a powerful, centralized political organization imposing rules on what had been diverse populations and shaping the way people thought of themselves and the larger meaning of their lives certainly could be found in the earlier social science and policy literature. Many social scientists, implicitly or explicitly, understood political institutions as moulding people to think of themselves first in terms of the political space claimed by the state (for example, as *French* within the territory claimed by France) and only secondarily in terms of their other interests and social organizations (for example, as farmers, Catholics, or Bretons, or even Algerians, at one point).

State autonomy, then, indicated a power separate from, even above, the fractious groups interacting in a given space – a power that could relegate these other organizations to a subservient role. Even in cases where it could not blend people into some harmonious whole, that is, shape them into a single social entity, such as a nation with an overriding unitary identity, the autonomous state could at

[5] While much was made by them of the innovation of their approach in placing the autonomous state at the centre of analysis, in fact, long before the appearance of their book, some other researchers had employed a similar conception of the state as an actor powerful enough to change existing currents in society. As far back as the late 1950s, for example, the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, based at the University of Chicago, incorporated the idea of a strong state imposing itself upon, even shaping, society. Note the words of David Apter, a key member of the Committee, in a book, *Old Societies and New States*, that was probably the Committees most important publication: 'The state as a legal expression is not merely that of society in legal terms. It is also the basis for requiring obligation to the community…The society gives purpose to the individual. The state bases itself on the right to express that purpose and exact from its citizens those obligations necessary to ensure success. It may do so in a variety of ways, some of which appear to obliterate the individual. Identity, then, through citizenship, locates the individual in relation to his obligations' (Apter 1965: 90).

In one of the most influential scholarly books of the 1960s, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* published nearly two decades before *Bringing the State Back In*, Huntington's insistence on the centrality of autonomy for political institutions heralded the emphasis of many later researchers on the autonomous state.

least mediate among them, establish rules of contestation, and serve as a court of last resort, all within a moral and legal frame based on its own political boundaries. As the rule-giver and the rule-enforcer, the state stood out as the ultimate force in people's lives, shaping their daily behaviour and even how they thought of themselves and the meaning they attached to their actions and lives (the state was something for which one would even give up his or her life). Even when state identity was not primary (as it was in the nation-state), the state's political boundaries constituted a social boundary by encompassing the people – society – who related to each other through the state-generated moral and legal universe within set and recognized boundaries.

Perhaps the biggest irony involving *Bringing the State Back In* was that it heralded the imagined autonomous state precisely at the outset of the storm that precipitated transformative crises in actual states – the rush of petrodollars followed by the precipitous drop in oil prices, through-the-ceiling debt, the emergence of the IMF as a force demanding internal structural changes in national economies, the consolidation of Gorbachev's power and his determination to end the Cold War, the collapse of the South as an effective bloc in world politics, and more. These forces led to the crippling of what had seemed to be the promising new central state organizations of Africa and sent others in Asia, Latin America, and Europe into prolonged crises regarding their powers and prerogatives. Autonomous-state theory came to be canonized at the very moment that real states began a nosedive, with a host of forces nibbling away at their supposed insularity and supreme position within their borders.

Globalization and the Attack on the Autonomous State

Another stream of social science literature in the late 1980s and the 1990s took a different path from that found on autonomy. This school grew out of the dependency and world-systems literature that had gained currency in the 1970s. Both of those had challenged existing historiography and social science approaches by rejecting the presumption of the insularity of states. The concept of insularity directed scholars to analyze events, processes, and qualities within territorial boundaries to explain social and political formations, as well as change (or the lack of it). This focus was a point of convergence for both the state autonomy scholars and those who looked to broader elite, normative, and systemic factors. Dependency theorists, such as Frank (1967), saw porous state territorial boundaries, not well insulated ones. Rejecting the historiographical presumptions of earlier thinkers, they explained highly stratified, economically deformed patterns of Latin American (and other non-Western) societies in terms of forces found in far-off metropoles, in the United States and Europe. The ability of Western states and corporations to transcend Latin American states' territorial boundaries with impunity, through the collaboration of key economic and political elites in these states, underlay the creation and perseverance of Latin American under-development. While Evans (1979) tried to straddle the divide between

dependency and state-centered approaches, for the most part dependency theorists roundly condemned the assumption of a world defined by impermeable state borders.

Similarly, a variety of world-system approaches put forth by Meyer/Hannan (1979), Modelski (1987), Dunn (1995), and others and, most notably, by Wallerstein (1974), followed dependency theories in attacking the old historiography. Going beyond the dependency theorists' point about the permeability of boundaries, they contended that the territorial state was not at all the appropriate unit of analysis to understand social formations and change – especially the skewed distributions of wealth and power locally and worldwide. The fitting boundaries to understand existing relations and change are those of sprawling interactive, transnational systems, of which in today's world there is only one, spanning the entire globe. In this conception, state boundaries could be understood as sieves, filtering out some things but letting many others through, within a larger, more meaningful unit of analysis, the world system.

Given the popularity of globalization theories only twenty or so years after the ascent of dependency and world-systems approaches, it is surprising how rapidly those earlier works faded in the scholarly imagination and how little credit the globalization writers have paid to their predecessors who had moved away from state-centered analysis. Perhaps the Marxist ideological project of numerous (but by no means all) world-system writers as opposed to the liberal designs of so many globalists accounts for the amnesia of those touting globalization. In any case, while the present-day works on globalization have rejected dependency's tendency to analyze social dynamics in dyadic or bilateral terms and world system's penchant to see interactions in such tight terms that they appeared almost conspiratorial, they have shared the earlier scholars skepticism about the centrality of the state. They have turned dependency theory's morality tale – the evil exploitation of permeable, weak societies – on its head: the penetration of state boundaries by global forces has been, and will continue to be, a liberating process, leading to widespread prosperity and well-being.

Globalization theories gained momentum, particularly towards the end of the twentieth century, by arguing that the vaunted state that Evans *et al.* had trumpeted was, in fact, in the midst of its swan song. One scholar, Saskia Sassen, put the case in rather moderate terms: 'The growth of a global economy in conjunction with the new telecommunications and computer networks that span the world has profoundly reconfigured institutions fundamental to processes of governance and accountability in the modern state' (Sassen 1996: xi). The punch line comes in what old processes Sassen sees as collapsing – sovereignty and territorial exclusivity. 'Sovereignty', she goes on, 'remains a feature of the system, but it is now located in a multiplicity of institutional arenas: the new emergent transnational private legal regimes, new supranational organizations (such as the WTO and the institutions of the European Union), and the various international human rights codes. All these institutions constrain the autonomy of national states' (Sassen 1996: 29).

As is clear in Sassen, the globalization literature singled out the forces – economic mostly, but others as well – that cut across state boundaries, determining life opportunities and shaping individual behaviour and, by their very nature, subverting the state's attempt to insulate and privilege its defined space. The sovereign state and its correlate institutions, such as citizenship and civil society, then, become an artifact of 'cultural and historical specificity' (Sassen 1996: xiii), that is, an institution whose time has passed. It is not that Sassen denies the core assumptions of state theorists about what a state is. She declares readily that rule in the modern world has flowed 'from the absolute sovereignty of the state over its national territory' (Sassen 1996: 3). The bone she picks with these state theorists is whether the historical conditions that supported the old assumptions have now passed. 'Can we continue to take for granted', she asks, 'as much of the literature on the state does over and over again, that the [state's] exclusive authority [is] ... today the same as it was before the current phase of globalization...?' (Sassen 1996: xv).

In short, this mode of research contested the central claims of the autonomous-state literature. Writers on globalization mostly attacked the idea of autonomy, arguing that powerful outside forces (based on wholly different configurations of space from that of the state) have begun to shred states' pretensions of dominance in shaping their societies. Rules now, the claim goes, are generated as much, or more, by powerful forces whose centres are outside the state's territory as they are by the state apparatus.

More works than one could count have attested to the demise of the autonomous state. Much of this literature has overstated the case that global economic (and other) forces have crippled the state (Migdal 2001, chap. 5). Many international and transnational forces have propped it up more than they have sabotaged it. Frequently, the state has become the all-important mediator between global actors and the domestic population, putting state officials in a position to enhance their power over society through the control of key distributional mechanisms, directing such resources as foreign aid, loans, and investments and using them as levers to propagate state rules.

Still, globalization enthusiasts have rightly pointed to the contingent nature of state boundaries. Not only might physical boundaries of states change, as they have in recent years for several in Eastern Europe, but the social nature of boundaries might also be subject to change. States' varying abilities to maintain the insularity of their borders in controlling flows of labour, goods, and capital have meant that not all boundaries have produced the vaunted insularity associated with the state-cantered literature. More than that, different configurations of space associated with these movements of people, products, and cash – from smuggling rings to multi-national corporations – have offered alternative social configurations, as well, including with whom people associate, where their supreme loyalties lie, and what their primary identities are. The parameters of society might not be explained best by state boundaries at all but by these alternative configurations of space, such as those encompassing transnational families, which might span several continents.

Numerous alternative configurations might now pose similar challenges to states around the world that Jews did to so many European states, whose officials and non-Jewish population so often suspected that the Jews' primary identity, loyalty, and practices were less defined by state boundaries than by the imagined boundaries of the Jewish world (Chirot 1997).

But, for all their telling criticisms of state-centered literature, globalists frequently have not abandoned some key elements of state theories. In fact, writers defending state autonomy and those championing the momentous impact of globalization have shared some key assumptions. To be sure, they have historicized those assumptions differently in that the state-autonomy researchers have continued to see the conditions that promoted the autonomous state as still largely extant (and, possibly, even enhanced), while the globalization scholars have pointed to new conditions undermining the state's ability to maintain its autonomy, especially since the exponential growth in the rates of capital movement starting around 1980. What do these two schools share about their understanding of the state in its heyday, even if they disagree on when that heyday was or is?

Sharing Assumptions about the State

For both researchers professing the continuing strength of the state and those touting the power of globalization, there is uniformity in *the idea* of the state, a standard understanding of what a state is. That is, both have pretty much the same view as to what a properly functioning state looks like and what it does. It tends to exhibit high levels of internal coherence, to use rational-legal methods to set the parameters of who gets what, to implement policies in a way that is faithful to stated policy and written law, to favour aggregate economic benefits through high overall growth rates over high benefits to some but with overall lower growth, to provide some minimal rewards and rights universally, to limit others from establishing competing ground-rules and systems for a biased distribution of rewards. And it achieves all this through a mix of violence (as in putting people in jail against their will), threats of violence, and means convincing people that what states do through their officials is the moral, right way for things to be done. In short, the common understanding of the state imagines a set of parameters for state-society relations, of the state's role in distributing rewards, and then canonizes that image. The two approaches put forth by statists and globalists both see state strength – its ability to transcend local and transnational forces – in its capacity to garner key resources from its own territory and from beyond. Recruitment of resources enables it to build powerful institutions, including armies, police, courts, regulatory agencies, schools, and more, that can enforce particular rules of behaviour among its population and socialize people as to the appropriateness of the state's role in making rules for daily behaviour and the intrinsic rightness of those rules.

In Weber's terms, as noted above, this image is an ideal-type. It is what a state firing on all cylinders is imagined to be. Of course, in real human society, no state

can do all that an ideal-type state is imagined to, as Weber makes perfectly clear (Weber 1988: 190). Tremendous variation has existed among states in the levers that they have controlled in order to garner resources and to accomplish this skewed distribution of economic (and other) opportunities; in the sheer quantity of resources they could mobilize through taxation, aid, plunder, conscription, and so on; in their effectiveness in making sure the resources ended up in the hands they wanted; in the inner coherence they exhibited in deciding and acting upon whom to favour; and in the means they used to achieve the selective distribution of rewards. Those differences among states are extremely important (for scholars of the state, these variations have been the stuff of comparative politics).

It is not only that differences exist from state to state but also that world-historical conditions may move real states as a group closer to, or farther from, the imagined ideal-type. Here is where state-autonomy and globalization theorists part ways, over how far from the ideal-type contemporary states can be expected to deviate. The state-autonomy theorists point to all sorts of conditions that have enhanced state power, from technological improvements in means of surveillance to fine-tuned fiscal instruments that allow them to manage economic cycles effectively. These theorists point to the tendency of important international actors to single out the state as their interlocutor. Globalists, on the other side, talk of other circumstances, which undercut state ability to approach the ideal-type, from spiraling increases in international capital flows to information flows that undercut the state's territorially-based message. These theorists highlight the augmented power of transnational institutions that limit state choices. Even with all the high-tech surveillance techniques at hand, they indicate, record numbers of people are crossing borders in direct opposition to state laws.

But both sorts of theories approach the question of variation among states, at any given time or in changing world-historical moments, similarly. Variation can be conceptualized and measured only as distance from the ideal-type. As long as the *idea* of the state is uniform and constant, the variation of states, even the failure of some states, can be expressed only in terms of deviation from the standard. If real states fell short of the standard, as they were bound to do, all sorts of words had to be invented to express the gap between actual practice and the ideal. Terms, such as quasi-states, soft states, shadow states, weak states, non-state states, decay, corruption, weakness, and relative capacity, all implied that the way things really work are somehow exogenous to the normative model of what the state and its relations to society are, or should be. Comparison comes in specifying and measuring deviation from the norm or the ideal-type. State capacity can be gauged against a measuring stick whose endpoint is a variant of Weber's ideal-type of the modern rational state. For non-European states, the danger is that the one measure, the ideal-type state drawn from European experience, creates a hierarchy in which those farthest from the ideal-type are lowest on the hierarchy. This methodological point is made quite well by Fernandes (1997: 13):

> The point is to develop an analytical framework that can generate generalities without creating a hierarchy of cases, in which one context provides the basis for an ideal type and other contexts provide the field for the application and testing of this ideal type. The establishment of such a hierarchy in fact hinders the comparativist project by creating both methodological and theoretical biases. When categories of analysis are derived from particular contexts, general conclusions drawn from such analysis reflect the conclusions of these particular contexts and do not provide us with a comparative understanding of social and political phenomenon. This disjuncture is perhaps most evident when categories derived from a Western European context are transposed onto 'Third World' cases.

Fernandes (1997: 16) goes on to note that rejecting these ideal types has the added benefit of shedding new light on the Western experience, as well, through an examination of the struggles in the West where contested meanings have been lost in the narrow focus on the form of the ideal type.

Questioning Assumptions about the State

The understanding of Weber's ideal-type conception of the state that became dominant in the study of politics presents serious difficulties both normatively (something for which leaders strive and which is seen as the proper form of rule) and analytically (something that scholars want to study in all its rich variation). The standard understanding of the state as *the* rule-maker, either enacting the rules for human behaviour itself or authorizing other social organizations, such as families and businesses, to make and enforce some rules puts a tremendous burden on the state. The assumption that only it does, or should, create rules and that only it does, or should, maintain the violent means to bend people to obey those rules minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur in every human society among multiple systems of rules. It posits a human society where one incredibly coherent and complex organization exercises an extraordinary hegemony of thought and action over all other social organizations intersecting that territory. It has no way to theorize about arenas of competing multiple sets of rules, other than to term these as negative, as failures or weak states or even non-states.

Social scientists, starting decades ago, felt a keen need to soften that assumption by creating additional categories to study states that took into account how overburdened any state would be that even tried to reach that ideal of pure autonomy. Neo-patrimonialism, for example, was a concept put forward attempting to capture the limited capabilities of actual states and their systems of rule that were decidedly not rational-legal in nature (for example, Eisenstadt 1973). Even the champion of bringing the state back in, Evans, wrote a book a decade later trying to come to terms with his observations that autonomy is far more attenuated than he had imagined earlier (Evans 1995).

The difficulty with the ideal-type autonomous state, acting on its own preferences, is that this image did not open the way for scholars to unravel the most difficult of tasks that states face, garnering the resources to maintain and reproduce themselves. Mobilizing those resources necessarily involves complex alliances and networks with particular elements of that population, as well as with key outsiders. That is, in order to create a lifeline of revenues and human power to sustain itself, the state must share or direct resources in ways that favour certain groups of the population. Evans' softening of his assumptions in his latter book was an attempt to come to terms with the alliances between states and favoured portions of the population.

But without abandoning the ideal-type typology, these sorts of modifications run into difficulties conceptually. A central problem is the primacy of law and a rational-legal order underpinning the understanding of the state. These accounts shift uneasily between two views of how states 'imagine' their societies, which are in tension with one another. On the one hand, the central activity of the state, making and enforcing rules, assumes that the population of the territory constitutes an almost totally inclusive public (certain aliens and tourists might not be included, but these are marginal exceptions). The rules of the state, then, are expressed in universal terms, placing them above any possible rules of other, competing organizations with alternative conceptions of how to configure space. The state defines these other rules as parochial, divisive and tendentious. On the other hand, the state's unquenchable thirst for resources leads it to adopt practices that favour particular groups in the territory. Now, one could certainly imagine the 'corruption' of universal-type laws because of exogenous factors like greedy officials. The difficulty is that Evans would like to endogenize the second type of particularistic behaviour that comes through alliances with particular groups. And that is not possible given his starting assumptions.

Those studying law have begun in recent years to deal with this anomaly. Instead of treating state law as a single, dominant code and all deviations from it as simple illegality, legal pluralists have begun to consider law as a many-sided phenomenon. Legal pluralists have portrayed numerous normative orders, that is, plural systems of law, co-existing. Non-state normative orders have been, in part, constituted by state law, but they may, in turn, constitute state law (challenging one dimension of its putative autonomy). They may contribute to making of state law and/or they may challenge the hegemony of codified state law. Even more, there may exist multiple normative orders, complementary or in tension with one another, within the state itself.

One cannot capture this sort of plurality by simply measuring deviation from a norm or softening some assumptions about autonomy. The challenge is to illuminate the variation in forms of the state expressed in this pluralism, rather than reducing all cases to more or less straying from the ideal-type. Would it not be more useful to develop a more inclusive understanding of the state, one that would encompass (rather than label as deviant or corrupt) the variety of attributes and

rules associated with the state's role in distributing rewards and opportunities? Could one instead start out with a broader understanding of states as not an integrated organization but as entities with multiple forms of institutionalization? Parts of the state then can enter into alliances and coalitions with other social actors (domestic and international). State boundaries, not only territorial ones but social ones, too, apparently move, and they are differently configured in varying circumstances.

The challenge theoretically is, then, to develop a limited set of types categorizing the variety of states: their differing configurations of social and territorial boundaries, their multiple relations with those inside and outside their formal boundaries. The goal here is to sketch such a categorization by classifying the dynamics that underlie the process of boundary construction and re-construction. To do this, an understanding of the state is needed that captures both its unity as a singular state and its diversity in actual boundary construction. The next section sets out a post-Weberian conception of the state, which encompasses both the state's singular and multiform side. We will then turn to a categorization of state dynamics.

A Post-Weberian Conception of the State

The following conception distinguishes between 'seeing the state' and 'doing the state'. Both state actors (functionaries, customs officials, policemen, teachers, legislators, and the like) and non-state actors (the broader population in the territory and those outside the territory who interact repeatedly with state actors) 'see' the state in a particular way; they have a mental picture of it as an integral unit, a way of conceiving what it is about and in which kind of affairs it plays or should play a role. While states are sprawling and complex, seeing the state means capturing it in the mind's eye as a single whole. This is what we call the 'image' of the state. While this image may not be universal – and may not even be identical for all the people in a given territory – it has taken hold widely over the globe over the last two centuries. The modern state as a singular actor, in fact, is one of the most commonly held images in today's world across diverse areas and cultures.

State actors and non-state actors also 'do' the state. Teachers teach and their students learn in state schools. Traffic police enforce state laws, and drivers obey or try to avoid the police. Border officials check passports and issue visas, and tourists present their passports or smugglers seek ways to bypass the check point. Police may hand out tickets for violations or possibly accept money not to issue the ticket, while drivers may pay the ticket or stuff some cash into the shirt pocket of the police officer. Tax authorities may track down people's incomes, while entrepreneurs may try to hide parts of their incomes or just follow the rules. Doing the state involves the diverse, multiple actions of state actors as well as the myriad

responses and interactions with state officials of non-state actors. These actions are what we call the 'practices' of the state.

Both the image and practices of the state involve power, inducing people to think and behave in ways that they would otherwise not do, and particularly using the most direct inducement of all, violence. Acceding to power can range from being generally law-abiding, that is, accepting the state as a whole as the proper law-giver that shapes everyday behaviour, to succumbing to the entreaty of the police officer for a side payment or sneaking around the border checkpoint to avoid detection. Power can flow from state actors to non-state actors or the opposite, as when non-state actors induce state personnel to accept or bend certain rules. The process in which power is exercised involves a constant struggle among multiple actors, both state and non-state. The patterns of this struggle, the ways that power flows repetitively and how the flows change, are what we refer to as the state's dynamics. The following conception of the state gives the tools to begin to capture those dynamics:[6]

> The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices involving those staffing its multiple parts and those they engage in their roles as state officials.

A key to this conception is the lack of any necessary unity or coherence to the combination of state image and state practices. In fact, the two may run in opposite directions. While the image conveys a unitary state law in a given realm, practices may divulge diverse ways in which that 'law' is actually played out in the interaction between teacher and student, police officer and driver, tax collector and taxpayer. It is the ongoing relationship of image to practices, how they reinforce each other and how they undermine each other, which our conception seeks to capture.

The struggle over power occurs in multiple sites, involving both state officials and others determined to press different demands on people. Pierre Bourdieu's (1985) concept of field, what he terms relationships in a multi-dimensional space, encompasses those struggles. Within the field, the struggles involve efforts by state and non-state actors to have their rules, whether state law or some other implicit code, become the routine basis upon which people act. Indeed, a central part of state dynamics revolves around efforts by state actors to change the raw power of curbing people's behaviour into a more stable, institutional form. This transformation is what Weber conceived as the move from power to 'domination'.[7]

---

[6] This definition developed during the meetings of the group that presents its results in this book. A slightly different version is presented in Migdal (2001: 16).

[7] The difference comes clearly to the fore in Weber's famous definitions of power and domination. Power (*Macht*), he says, 'is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his won will despite resistance'. Domination

The extent to which a field actually becomes one of state domination varies considerably both within a country and from one state to another. In many cases, 'the state' is not the deeply institutionalized set of rules expressed in the standard image but rather a shaky field of power relations that are not much more than sheer coercion and brute force. Or the field may have a pattern in which institutionalized practices far different from those expressed in the image of the Law, practices often involving partnerships of state and non-state actors, are the basis for domination.

The ongoing relation of image to practices provides the innovation in this conception of the state. This interaction is dynamic and departs from conceptions of the state that are static, which lead to the petrification of a defined object. The following paragraphs elaborate some of the components of this conception of the state. Many of these components can be found in the existing body of state theory, but they have been recontextualized into a process-oriented, dynamic conception of the state.

The use and threat of violence have been part and parcel of practically all attempts to define the state. Weber emphasized the co-optation of those schooled in, and able to exercise, violence by an agent who then establishes a monopoly over the means and use of violence. Subsequently, Norbert Elias showed that this step was inextricably linked historically in Europe to the development of a monopoly of taxation. He also added the notion that the state's monopoly of violence affected the psychic structures of the ruled, making them susceptible to domination (an oblique reference to the move from the practice of violence to the power of the image of the state). Subsequent state theories have also accepted the monopoly of violence as the necessary precondition for all other sorts of state activities.

In the need to understand the state in terms of power, and particularly violence, the conception above does not differ from the emphasis of Weber, Elias, and others. The departure begins in the understanding that the exercise of power varies and is shaped by image and practices. Taking account of the different ways in which image and practices condition the flows of power will enable scholars to talk about a variety of states, including many present-day states that do not have anywhere near a monopoly of violence, no matter how hard their leaders have sought it.

Image. State leaders have sought to unite officials under them to mould an image that has at least four characteristics: the state as singular, as supreme rule-maker, as separate or bounded, and as a representation. The image conveys the idea of the state as the dominant and single centre of authority (Shils 1975: 74). In the conception here, the image of the state is of a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls, in a given territory, all rule-making, either directly through its

---

(*Herrschaft*) 'is the probability that a command with specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons'. Domination refers to an already established hierarchy, to established rules, cf. Popitz (1986).

own agencies or indirectly by sanctioning other authorized organizations, including businesses, families and clubs, to make certain circumscribed rules.[8] The ability to harness and use violence certainly enhances the image and, conversely, the success of the image in taking hold of people's imaginations shapes the ability to exercise power and use violence. In short, the image of the state is as the chief and appropriate rule-maker within its territorial boundaries. In that regard, it is a single entity that is fairly autonomous, unified, and centralized. The strength of this image of any given state as a coherent, controlling organization in today's world derives, at least in part, from the global idea of statehood. The spread of this idea is historically rooted in the process of the 'statization of the world' (Reinhart, 1999), the outcome of European expansion.[9] Be it via the direct colonial experience or by mimicking of occidental ideals, as in the case of Japan or Kemalist Turkey, political leaders adopted this image and tried to mould their relations to societies accordingly.

The image of the state is also one of an entity that is clearly bounded. In this image, territorially, it is marked off from other states, and, within that territory, it is separated conceptually from the general population. Both the separation of the state from other states and from the general population has strong social implications, making that general population into something more than a collection of diverse peoples. They are united in this image into their own singular entity – society or the nation. The heterogeneous people within the boundaries claimed by the French state, then, become French society or the French nation. And they are made that because of their relationship to the French state. Thus, in the image of the state, the boundaries separating states from each other and state from society have strong social implications (Ruggie 1993). If, for example, state leaders are successful in imposing their image of the state, the state is not only separated, it is elevated. That is, the state as the representation of society distinguishes it from all other entities; other social forces in the image can signify only particular or parochial interests. The image portrays the state exclusively as the general representation of the commonality of the people.

Indeed, the image of the state has been extraordinarily powerful throughout the world. Even in countries that have experienced long civil wars and violent internal struggle, the idea of statehood as a form of representation has seldom been dismissed. Even if large parts of the population have sought to quit a state they belong to, having rejected the state as a representation of them, the alternative is not statelessness but to build yet another state. The statization of minds has been so successful that no major political actor in the contemporary world has denied statehood as such, and only a few have aimed to redesign the current order of the world as one of states.

---

[8] Weber writes, 'The right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence' (Weber 1964: 78).

[9] On this term cf. Krippendorff (1986), Siegelberg (2000) and Luethy (1967).

The notion of the state as representative contains a contradictory core. On one side, all over the world, state actors have clung to the idea that 'national' societies are contained within the territory that demarcates the boundaries of a world of states. The image of the state, as our conception notes, is of an organization that is a representation of the people bounded by the state's territory. These national societies have appeared in the image as natural phenomena, which thus have had the effect of naturalizing, too, the state's status as representation of such national societies. On the other side, leaders and followers alike have recognized that these leaders have actually found collections of people in their often arbitrary borders who have had little in common, not even a common language; that is, there is the absence of any 'natural' society. State leaders have sought to make the image of representation of society real by moulding the motley people of the territory into a single People, capable of singular representation. In this sense, state leaders have looked on 'their' societies as objects that need to be 'developed', controlled, supported, and contained. Foucault outlined the forms of these very broad projects when he introduced the concept of *gouvernementalité* for early modern European states. But other states, outside Europe, have developed such projects, as well. The idea of the developmental state is a case in point.[10]

Practices. While the image of the state has had a powerful hold on popular imagination, it alone has not defined the state or shaped the field of power. It has existed alongside practices, the second key shaping element of our conception.[11] The routine performance of state actors and agencies, their day-in and day-out practices, may reinforce the image of the state or weaken it; they may bolster the notion of the territorial and public-private boundaries or neutralize them.

Endless numbers of practices have bolstered the image that the territorial markers on maps are real and effective. State leaders have employed visas, passports, official maps, school textbooks, border markers, barbed wire and electronic fences, border police, armies, and more to mark off the territory that the state purports to govern. This list makes clear that the threat or use of violence has stood behind many of the state's practices. In many others, though, the use of violence has been practically non-existent and even the threat of violence, remote. Bureaucrats, teachers, drivers of public busses, all act in the name of the state, reproducing its very boundaries generally without the use of violence or even the overt threat to employ it. Because the image of the state, in the end, is a symbol of the unity of what one might otherwise think of as thousands of disparate workers, agencies, and bureaus, it is not surprising that states employ rituals and ceremonies

[10] Foucault's text on governmentality is to be found in Burchell/ Graham/ Gordon/ Miller (1991: 87-104). On the debate on the developmental state and its historical timing and its global shaping cf. Schlichte (2000).

[11] The term practices that became prominent in social theory with the writings of Michel de Certeau (1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1985) refer to regularized patterns of action and behaviour. To put it in Weberian terms, practices encompass both social action and mere behaviour.

to solidify that symbol. From the robes of the judge to the coronation of the king, ceremonies and rituals serve as practices to bolster the image of the singular state. Participation by the populace in such rituals, along with other daily behaviour by the people, can similarly buttress the image.

But just as there are practices that have fortified the image of the state, others have weakened or neutralized that image. Even as state actors have tried to impose the boundaries separating the state from society or one state from another, they have encountered an endless array of 'strategies and tactics' (de Certeau 1984: xix) that have served to bend or to escape those boundaries. While the image has the state encroaching on the inner workings of society, actual practices can resist that encroachment. In addition, while some state actors themselves may employ practices that strengthen the image of the state, others may employ those that weaken the image; they may enter into partnerships with other state actors or non-state actors that have the effect of ignoring the separation between state and society, private and public, state A and state B. The effects of these practices can be very far-reaching: The extreme case is the dissolution of the state, when people's practices deny the state, ignore its rules, and contradict its aspirations. It is in this sense that Weber assessed the question of state decay: 'Sociologically, a state ceases to exist when the chance is disappearing that particular forms of meaning-oriented actions occur' (Weber 1988: 568). What remains then, however, is the image of the state – as a reference. What this conception of the state captures, allowing new theoretical lines to emerge, is precisely how the dynamics of states work. These dynamics are not restricted to deliberate policy by the state or non-state actors, by any means. Indeed, a focus on official policy alone can be very misleading. Actual states have not simply been institutionalized as mirrors of the universal image of the state as singular, dominant, bounded, and representative. The forms of actual institutionalization – the way that power has been transformed into routinized patterns of domination – have derived from the interaction, and tension, between that image and everyday practices. It is to those dynamics that we now turn.

The State as a Process

The dynamics of the state involve its changing image, its changing practices, and the changing relationship between them, as well as the effects of all these changes on the field of power that is the state. In this process social groups are transformed, including their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting. Like any other group or organization, the state, then, is constructed and re-constructed, invented and re-invented, through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with others. It is not a fixed entity; its organization, goals, means, partners, and operative rules change as it allies with and oppose others in and outside its territory. The goal of social scientists should not be to isolate a snapshot of the state and try to explain vectors that produced that static picture, a process that Elias called

Zustandsreduktion;[12] rather, they need to identify the contours of the ongoing *process* of change – the dynamics of the state. Elias suggested what he called the *prozess-soziologische Methode*, an orientation that takes the inner contradictions of social processes into account and acknowledges the change of the constituent elements (1977).

The essays in this book reflect the move from static approaches to a conception that focuses on processes, the ongoing interactions of elements and the way they are mutually shaped and reshaped. This move requires some explanation. In this section, we will deal with practices that fortify and solidify the state image and those that are at odds with that image. By drawing on the evidence in the cases we will then sketch how these dynamics affect the very boundaries that circumscribe a state's realm and on which it rests simultaneously.

A Word on Processes

Much has been made of the rigor of the methods used in rational-choice, empirical/quantitative, structural, and other fashionable approaches in the social sciences. But this rigor is as limiting as it is illuminating. The presentation of highly stylized pictures in which the action is frozen, in which one is presented with static independent variables in the context of other non-dynamic factors (such as fixed preferences or structures or institutional arrangements) bearing the weight of causality, places far too restrictive blinders on students of comparative domination and change. The point in putting the emphasis on process, on dynamics, is to avoid searching for one-way causality that starts at a key moment or some critical juncture. Existing methods popularly found in political economy, rational-choice, and structural analyses tend to overemphasize the explanatory power of independent variables. By fixing those variables in time, they ignore how the effects that they spawn may, in turn, transform them. Dealing with the question of how to explain the variety of outcomes of state-building, most studies try to trace what might be called the moment of original sin – the event or crossroads from which one can read back to the present to see how the current state of affairs came into being.

Stories of the institutionalization of power in a territory do not end with the original sin or the critical juncture where there is the imposition of a powerful normative force; indeed, that is precisely where the most interesting part of the story often begins. Strong normative forces, leaders who have harnessed the means of violence, new institutions, a cataclysmic event such as war, all call into being resistance and struggle, cooperation and coalitions, that transform the original impulse and the actors themselves. The creation of any strong form of domination induces those subject to it, in the words of Robert Cover, 'to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify' (Cover 1993: 100, 102). In

[12] This statement comes from an interview that he gave in Amsterdam in 1969; cf. Goudsblom/Mennell (1998: 143).

other words, the institutionalization of any field of power brings strong reactions, which transform those imposing power and those whose behaviour it aims to change. Existing understandings of rigor in social science may divert the observer from those continuing dynamics.

Existing methods in social science, by seeking to explain the freeze-frame image in terms of a timeless configuration of independent variables also run the risk of losing the importance of history. Many scholars in social sciences, like Norbert Elias, have rightly insisted on the historicity of the objects of social sciences. It is only through the historical perspective with its varying time horizons, that the importance and 'deepness' of changes can be assessed, he argued. This view is shared by Jean-François Bayart (1996), who in his recent work introduced the term *trajectoire*, or 'trajectory', in order to come to terms with the historicity of societies and states. He felt that the historical dimension has been neglected in the study of non-European societies. States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were not just 'imported' but have been the outcomes of complex interactions, of local dynamics in the course of the integration into the modern world system. States outside Europe have indigenous social roots, as well; they are anchored in the logic of their societies. Even colonial states were largely formed by these local forces and their interaction with the new European institutions. The colonial experience was not, as Bayart stresses, a history of mere submission. It was always simultaneously a story of alliances and collaboration, that is to say, of active involvement on the part of the colonized themselves.[13] Furthermore, colonial and post-colonial states were built on longstanding traditions and practices, which themselves were historically formed. The ruptures, overthrows, and continuities of these regions have helped shape the contemporary forms of political domination. His concept of the *trajectoire* enables scholars to deal with the heterogeneity of states without falling back into the teleology of 'developmentalism', with its emphasis on the common outcomes of modern states. The emphasis on trajectory also allows for so-called external events to be endogenized into the analysis of state dynamics. In other words, such an approach treats outside forces as part of the mix of state and non-state actors participating in the local field of power, as 'the external' can only be seen and studied in the concrete context of the local.

The sort of method advocated by Elias, Cover, and Bayart extends to the territorial dimensions of states. Social scientists have tended to treat the territorial configurations of states as constants in their inquiries, as nearly invariable and largely uncontested. They have been inclined to see world space as carved up into static blocs called states, which can periodically go through an eruptive change, as in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but for long periods in between stay

[13] Recent sociological work on practices in colonial states reinforced this point. A master example is Trutz von Trotha's study on the colonial administration of German Togoland (1994) in which he shows how translators and 'chiefs', but also porters and servants could change their power as intermediaries between two worlds for the manipulation of the very fabric of the colonial state.

constant. Ian Lustick (1993) was one of the first theorists in recent years to challenge this perspective, urging scholars to see states as entities with often fundamentally contested, changing boundaries. Lustick's work has shown how dynamic even territorial borders are. But territorial lines are only the most obvious kind of boundaries that delineate the state. As the following paragraphs will sketch out, in the processes of state formation, all kinds of boundaries of the state are affected by the change of images and practices, including the lines between the legal and the illegal, the public and the private realm, the economy and the state, in addition to territorial borders. All of these are constantly moving; they are continually reconstructed. This is the state as a process.

Direction I: Fortifying the Image of the State

In any state, all sorts of factors fortify the state's image. Files have the state's stamp, officials receive their salaries from the state's budget, citizens have to apply for state licenses. All these actions serve to reproduce the state's image. Historically, the semantics supporting the state image developed in the household of the ruler. *Courtoisie* is the first form of this state-symbolism, as Norbert Elias has shown in his sociological analysis of kingdoms (1969). In the historical development of bureaucratic rule, these semantics have developed into a full-fledged '*raison d'Etat*' (Bourdieu 1997). They have been sustained by the interests of state employees and forged into texts by generations of jurists. The state has become part of the broader social landscape through numerous practices integrated into people's daily lives. But these practices cannot account for the specific content of the image of the state. Why is the image of the state so particular, why did it become so prominent that some authors see the state as the 'concomitant meaning of all operations that claim to be elements of the political system' (Luhmann 1984: 627)?

While the image of the state generically has derived from the development and spread of the European state to all corners of the world over a number of centuries, in any particular case, it has resulted, too, from deliberate actions by state leaders. These leaders have aimed to portray a particular picture by wrapping their power in a symbolic language. The symbolic language in any given case has drawn on existing sacred symbols and language and reconfigured them to bolster the image of the state. Terence O. Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm (1983) called this process the reinvention of tradition. Lions, eagles, Jerusalem, Masada, God, and countless other symbols have been incorporated into fortifying the image of the state.

Those symbols have been woven into complex narratives about the meaning of the state, including the state's representation of people's identity. Leaders thus use symbols and narrative to strengthen the idea of the state as the incarnation of a collective fate. The symbolism and narratives have also been connected to the meaning of the state's rule, or why it is proper – morally right – that it should determine the parameters of daily behaviour. In contemporary states, such meaning has included ideas of what its rule is about – justice, development, democracy, and

the like. In foundational myths, 'national' histories have merged with the state as a political form, whose purpose is to ensure the realization and stability of collective achievements. Problems with these representations arise when the change of generations alters the relations between those who experienced the moments of revelation, as for example the victory in a war of independence, and new generations longing for their own redemption, something the state cannot deliver.

The production of narratives and the manipulation of symbols take place in all sorts of state agencies. In accounting for the terrifying power of the German totalitarian state, Cassirer (1988) stressed its mythological side. To him, myths are symbolic forms that do not vanish with progressing modernity. In times of uncertainty, in deep social and political crises, modern societies have been susceptible to the mystification of their own functioning. A myth is a picture, as Cassirer puts it, a compression of feelings in picture-like symbols and, as such, it is a symbolic form like any other: A myth is a synthesis, implying a cosmology, introducing and justifying differences, as between the sacred and the profane. States and their agents have benefited from the legitimizing effects of myths. In some instances, such as Nazi Germany, this process involves the total mystification of the state, whose image derives almost exclusively from this complex of symbols and meanings, rather than from its everyday, utilitarian actions. In those systems, Cassirer points out, politicians play a dual set of roles: they need to be *homo faber* and *homo magus*. As *homo faber*, they need to operate as technicians devising day-to-day policies, but as *homo magus* they 'employ magic', preaching the new religion of the state and its reigning myth.

The creation of rites and ceremonies is an integral part of attempts to mould the image of the state. Rites serve to illustrate and actualize myths. In his analysis of a day in the life of the then French President François Mitterand, the anthropologist Marc Abélès (1991) stressed the importance of such rites and ceremonies in the everyday life of states. The opening of new highways, speeches at particular occasions, and related sorts of ceremonies, all reinforce the state's image and its claims. In rites, references to the past are combined with new procedures. State leaders try to enhance the state's legitimacy by appropriating old, sacred references and put them to use in new contexts for their own ends. Rites and ceremonies anchor political domination in worlds of meaning allegedly handed down by earlier generations, emphasizing the *longue durée* of a society.

These symbolic strategies also embrace the use of language. Since protean political acts are rather colorless, politicians use metaphor to integrate means and ends, values and aims, in making sense of every day life (Münkler 1994: 126). Metaphors render 'the unillustrated illustrative, the polysemic unambiguous'. Metaphors, such as the 'father of the nation', the 'land of the free and home of the brave', the 'land of the upright', or the state as a 'machine', 'organism', 'corporation', or 'institutionalized revolution', all illustrate the ways language is used to bolster the image of states. All this is done to place the current political authority into a broader image, rooting it in the longstanding patterns of social life.

Dynamics fortifying the image of the state involve, not only the effect of practices on the image itself, but the effect, as well, of the image on practices. The image of the state employing a unified and sacred Law, for example, affects (although not necessarily determines) everyday interactions of state officials and citizens. It establishes a common set of references of how to act, conduct business, behave in state offices, treat state personnel (for example, calling judges Your Honor), and more. The image reinforces those practices, moving the institutionalizing of the state towards a more centrally controlled, coherent organization.

Foucault (1991: 103) probed the effect of practices on image at a time in which, he felt the coherence of the state image had been battered:

> But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.

Direction II: Weakening the Image of the State

While Foucault separates practices, or what he calls the tactics of governmentality, from image, he still tends to see such practices as reinforcing the state's image. But practices may also work against the myths and perceptions that underlay the state's image**.** Both state officials and the populace have motives and incentives to adopt and institutionalize practices that act to undermine the image of the state. Practices, in short, are often pitted against image. While the image of the state implies a singular morality, one standard way, indeed *right* way, of doing things, practices can denote multiple types of performance and, possibly, some contention over what is *the* right way to act.

They do so precisely when change in other fields occurs that affects the possibilities or likelihood of continuing state practices; when new markets open up, for example, people who had previously obeyed customs regulations might switch to smuggling. Generally speaking, practices that deviate from the official image occur if modes of action that circumvent the states' rules seem to be more promising and rewarding. This is what Michel de Certeau intended to show when he wrote about the development of 'tactics and strategies' that 'bend' or ignore the rules. He notes that these challenges are true even for the poorest and weakest groups in society:

> Innumerable ways of playing and foiling the other's game (in our case, the state's "game"), that is, the space instituted by others, characterize the subtle, stubborn,

> resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their own space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and representations (de Certeau 1984: 18).

These challenges to those practices consonant with the image of the state come not only from the dispossessed but from powerful elements, quietly or loudly championing alternative practices. Strong groups in society and well-placed individuals in the state institutionalize new networks, coalitions, alliances, and partnerships that produce alternative sets of practices, ones that defy the existing territorial boundaries of the state as well as the barrier between state and society, private and public, and legal and illegal. State agencies and bureaus are transformed from their use as envisaged in the image of the state to 'tools manipulated by users', in de Certeau's terms, by institutionalizing very different ways of doing things.

A wide variety of alternative sets of rules (many little laws as opposed to one big Law) may challenge the state's own official laws and regulations. The alliances, coalitions, or networks associated with these many laws have neutralized the sharp territorial and social boundaries that the official portrayal of the state has acted to establish, as well as the sharp demarcation between the state as preeminent rule-maker and society as the recipient of those rules. Such fragmentation of practices may occur even at the very core of the state. State officials may act in total conformity with the self-image of the state as a coherent agency at one moment and switch in the next instance to follow quite different imperatives.

How can one understand the appearance of multiple sets of practices, many of which may be at odds with the dictates of the image (and morality) of the state? The sheer unwieldy character of states' far-flung parts, the many fronts on which they fight battles with groupings with conflicting standards of behaviour, and the lure for their officials of alternative sets of rules that might, for example, empower or enrich them personally or privilege the group to which they are most loyal, all have led to diverse practices by states' parts or fragments.

Practices that are not in accordance with the standard image of the state are not simply deviations from normative – good – behaviour as set out in state codes. They are moral codes in their own right, contending with that expressed in the state's image for predominance in recruitment of officials into state offices, distribution of state resources, discretion in the application of regulations, and more. What may be easily labelled as corruption or criminality, such as nepotism or smuggling, can also be looked at as a code of morality favoring kinship ties over meritocracy or one expressing the right of movement of people and goods across borders arbitrarily-imposed by state law.[14] In contexts where the benefit of obeying or following the state's legal order is not obvious, it might even be more rational to follow the rules of the 'economy of affection', as Göran Hyden has shown (1983) in regard to peasant families' market behaviour in Africa.

---

[14] 'Instead of treating corruption as a dysfunctional aspect of state organizations, I see it as a mechanism through which the state itself is discursively constituted' (Gupta 1995: 376).

There are, then, several ways to explain why practices do not always follow the state's image. Rationality of alternatives is one: as long as the state has less to offer and other agencies are stronger or more efficient in the distribution of certain goods or services, it could be self-defeating, even suicidal, to act in accordance with state laws instead of obeying other moral codes. In *favellas*, *bidonvilles*, and other marginal areas, crime prosecution by state agencies is often not efficient. Protection from theft and robbery is then frequently organized by other social mechanisms, and any member of the society must pay attention to the moral codes that circumscribe the realm of these agencies. Here, it is the orientation of outcomes that is the reason for the success of practices that contradict the state's rules.

But not all of these moral codes that challenge the state are of-the-moment instrumental responses to everyday problems, and not all of them are induced by orientations toward outcomes. In almost any state, some groups contest the state's legitimacy to deal with particular issues due to differences in 'values': abortion, the right to have guns, the use of violence in families, the use of languages or customs and religious rites are cases where widespread anti-state attitudes with old historical roots can result in practices that come into conflict with state regulations. Practices in which Weber's value rationality (*Wertrationalität*) is of crucial importance regularly can generate severe political conflicts as they cut to the very core of the state's image: its idea of supremacy. The traditional legitimacy of older customary or religious-based rules might lead to fierce resistance against state policies and regulations.

State Dynamics and the Reconfiguration of Space and Time: The Importance of Boundaries in the Dynamics between Image and Practice

While the image of the modern state took hold across the globe by the second half of the twentieth century, it has varied in its hold on people's imaginations. Changes in the state image due to local or global events may also affect everyday practices, especially which practices state actors choose and with whom they engage. When the state does not take hold in people's imaginations as representative, moral, and coordinated, it opens the door for practices institutionalizing differently based relations in society and between state and non-state actors from those prescribed by state Law. Also, the decay of state institutions can induce a series of self-reinforcing practices undermining the state's image. Thus a massive capital flight induced by the wealthy can lead others to engage in tax evasion. These self-reinforcing processes can lead to a total collapse of public authority. It is, however, remarkable – and an indication of the strength of the dominant state image in today's world – that out of these situations states can often re-emerge very quickly. François Prkic sketches in his contribution in this volume how the 'phoenix state' of Liberia arose from civil war after the total decay of the former state.

Whenever those dramatic political changes occur, as in the case of the breakdown of public authority in Liberia or Somalia, the fluid and provisional character of statehood becomes apparent. As eternal and massive as the state seems to be in the standard image, the actual field of power can have very different lines from those implied by that image. These lines include not only territorial boundaries but other social boundaries, as well. The cases in this volume attest to the different way in which such boundaries configure the field of power.

Public and private. Of fundamental importance for the idea of the modern state, especially the liberal state is the line between public and private. According to this idea, there is a divide between social realms in which the state as an 'official authority' has the right to intervene and a private realm that is subject to the regulation by individuals or non-state agencies. The divide is so prominent that, in some parts of Western experience, '"public" became...synonymous with "statal"' (Habermas 1962: 33).

It is no news that the line between private and public is moving, porous, and crooked. But the ubiquity of the Western image of the state tends to obscure how and when this line is formed or dissolved and how those processes may differ from Western case. These are some of the questions raised by Jean-Louis Rocca in his contribution to this volume. He suggests that the processes of formation and of negation of the public-private divide can differ enormously. In the People's Republic of China, the formation of both state and society occurred without the prior emergence of a bourgeois private sphere that separated itself from the state – the conception of the creation of the public-private divide most commonly found in existing theories (cf. Ariès 1991). In China, the crystallization of the line between public and private has been the result of interlacing causal relations: of the socialization of the state and the statization of society.

More attention to these kinds of processes could help to reveal the factors shaping the modes of rule in sub-Saharan Africa. The term 'neo-patrimonialism' was perhaps the theoretically strongest and empirically most grounded characterizing post-colonial African states. It rightly ignores the distinctions between public and private, state revenues and a ruler's private funds, public policy and family affairs (cf. Médard 1991; Eisenstadt 1973). But the term alone does not offer any insight in the dynamics that have led to this form, nor does it tell much about contemporary changes. In order to advance the understanding of these processes, one needs to look more carefully at the processes underlying the relationship between image and practices.

Space. In the rush to understand states in institutional terms, it is important to remember Weber's cautionary note that a central dimension of the state is territory (Weber 1985: 713). The dynamics of image and practices affect the organization of territory or space and thus the way a field of power is institutionalized. In dealing with territory, it is important to treat it 1) as variable and 2) as social in character (not simply physical).

The common idea of political territorial borders separating spaces of control, or what we call fields of power, by different states is augmented by the common

notion that those states somehow embody the people inside their lines; this is what we referred to as representation in our conception of the state. Representation means that the state speaks for, reflects, and grows out of the population of the territory; the state is the unified expression of the diverse people inhabiting the territory. The underlying assumption here is that the people are connected in some fundamental way that allows their common representation. Everyday speech, common prejudices, and journalistic language reflect this notion of the relatedness of people of a country to one another. So, too, do major international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and countless others. Such representation signifies that territorial boundaries serve both as the physical limits of state control and the social circumscribing of a connected people. In some instances, state leaders seek to amend that physical and social limitation of the state. Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, for example, claimed that the state of Israel is a representation both of the population within its boundaries and of Jews, no matter where they might be located. But the need to state this exception affirms the general rule.

It is the notion of representation that makes territorial boundaries a social, not just physical, phenomenon. As social artifacts, then, territorial boundaries are 'real' only as long as they are observed, that is, accepted through social practice. Powerful states might be able to enforce this observance, as in the placing of border posts or engaging in aerial surveillance along the border. But territorial boundaries must exist, too, in the state's image – in the imagination of people inside and outside those boundaries. In the state's image, boundaries are lines that can stem and regulate the flow of ideas, goods, and people. Clandestine migration and smuggling are practices circumventing the rigidities of territorial boundaries that claim to delineate political space. These movements, then, may, in one sense, deny the existence of boundaries, rather than confirm them, by promoting movement where borders are supposed to restrict it and, in a different sense, actually confirm those borders by slipping a bribe to a state border official or resorting to moving stealthily in the night. Estimates of unrecorded and unregulated trade between Niger and Nigeria range up to 80 per cent of the total volume of commercial exchange between these countries.[15] Migration across state borders, legally and illegally, creates spaces of collective perceptions, that is, boundaries that do not coincide with the political world order so dear to school book maps. Diasporas, commercial *réseaux*, networks of political exile groups, the army of employees of international organizations and NGOs, smugglers, do not necessarily conceive their environment as ordered according to the principle of territoriality set out in the state's image. Other orderings of world space might be more relevant to them, ones independent of the official idea of territorial statehood. The state's image of territoriality is, then, just one way of conceiving space and, perhaps, not always the most important one.

---

[15] On these and other examples of the African contexts cf. Roitman (1998) and MacGaffey et al. (1991).

Precisely because territoriality became such an integral part of the idea of modern statehood, violations of boundaries and territorial disputes have remained high on the agenda of international relations, leading to high costs both in political efforts and human lives. As the example of the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning Jammu and Kashmir shows, territorial lines are value-laden, as they are not simply seen as administrative distinctions but as spatial expressions of 'bigger' claims. The example, dealt with in Boris Wilke's contribution, also indicates that despite the general impression that during the Cold War few international boundaries changed, change actually was tremendous. Not only was there the demise of the colonial empires and the resultant new mapping but small movements and arrangements occurred all the time. The principle of state territoriality itself, however, was never openly contested. In this regard, the image of the state once again proved to be quite durable, but the existence of contending practices quietly subverted and transformed that image.

Time. Territorial boundaries are meant to delineate the state in terms of space. The character of space is what Kant called a form of 'internal intuition' (*Anschauungsform*). And it is the most common way that people commonly conceive of states. But another form of internal intuition exists, as well, that of time. States also create 'temporal boundaries' and internal temporal orders. Public holidays, work times, school times, office hours, schedules of public transportation, maximum hours for a workday, maternal leave, all these temporal boundaries are part of the fabric of the state and its image as the supreme rule maker. State law sanctions age limits, the calendar that is used, tax days, and much more and it determines the insertion of national time-orders into the global one (and vice-versa). In some instances, temporal orders are even enforced with violent means, as in cases of military desertion or school truancy.

These temporal boundaries are crucial components of the image of the state and, like other parts of the image, may be bolstered or diluted through practices. Work time restrictions and permissible shopping hours become political issues in which the state's competence to rule is challenged. As in the case of territoriality as a political codification of space, the image of the state presents a synchronization of social life. The very idea of the developmental state[16] connects the image of the particular state with a project of social change according to the broader image formed in the West.

The task of state agents, according to the image, is to synchronize all parts of the society and to accelerate change. And, as in the case of spatial control, state successes in this regard are highly dependent on the degree of monetarization and capitalization of society. The intensification of interaction in a bourgeois society necessitates the conceptualization of time as linear and organizable (cf. Maier 1987: 164). In modern times, the task to organize these temporalities and to put through these orders even in the face of resistance by customary and traditional practices (what we might call the little laws) was assigned to state officials. Even

[16] On the history of this conception see Cumings (1999).

states existing in an environment of well-entrenched alternative practices have managed to exert a huge influence on the temporality of societies. As Schlichte's contribution on Uganda and Wilke's on Pakistan demonstrate, state leaders decide about the times of peace and the times of exception when rules are suspended, and when the state grants itself a period of 'unruled' rule.

However, in a globalized world, temporal orders and political rhythms tend to be internationally homogenized. This synchronization of time across state boundaries applies to the scheduling of elections as well as to the rhythms of accounting in public finance and national statistics. States are inserted into a 'world time' (Laidi, 1998), with its chains of events that create meanings of 'eras', such as the 'age of revolution' and 'the 1960s'. The achievements of 'development' and the timing of 'democratization' are measured in international comparisons. These international orderings of time constrain the options of states if they do not want to lose international recognition and support.

Another temporality of states can be seen in their representation as entities with histories. 'Spaces of experiences' (*Erfahrungsräume*) and 'horizons of expectations' (*Erwartungshorizonte*) (Koselleck 1989: 349) become intertwined in the state. In countries which experienced civil wars, such as Liberia and Uganda, the entire political debate has revolved around 'lessons' from the tumultuous past of the country and how to avoid the repetition of war and predatory rule. It is widely seen as the state's task to order society in this way. In this regard, the image of the state might be totally accepted even if numerous other practices display fierce resistance against the state's attempts to intrude upon society. The relations between the temporalities of individual lifetimes and state orders, between historical experiences and future options, might be as contradictory and complex as the different attitudes toward the ordering of space that result in practices that either strengthen or weaken the image of the state.

State and Society. The image of a boundary between the public and the private realm separates the state from other non-state, or private, actors and social forces. Weber noted that the separation of public and private – he was looking particularly at public and private law – is a hallmark of the modern, bureaucratized state. The conceptual separation of public and private law presupposes the conceptual separation of the state 'as abstract bearer of sovereign prerogatives and the creator of legal norms, from all personal authorizations of individuals' (Weber 1968: 239). But the practices of the state can affect the efficacy of this boundary, even among so-called modern, developed states.

The line between state and society is constantly reshaped, in words and in deeds. Very often, the reshaping of this boundary starts with practices that ignore the official boundary. Examples of such practices neutralizing or reconfiguring boundaries associated with the image of the state can be found in the contribution of Béatrice Hibou. The way in which so-called corruption and trafficking are controlled and allowed in Morocco, she argues, is just an indication of the state's malleability. It should not be inferred from an increase of informal, extra-legal activities that the state is necessarily in retreat or that it is a so-called 'failed state'.

Indeed, leaders and other officials may use these extra-legal practices to solidify their control, employing socially familiar types of behaviour to bolster political domination, rather than the above-board means associated with the image of the state. What is somewhat euphemistically called then 'privatisation of the state' (Hibou 1999) need not be a loss of domination by political leaders nor need such states be thought of as failed; it may simply imply practices suggesting a different mode of governing. These practices may bolster state domination at the same time that they run counter to the prevailing image of the state. They could also be just a change in mode of government. This is not to say that the results are unproblematic. The delegation of power to intermediaries, the resurgence of practices such as tax-farming, and the growth of private security arrangements, all render it difficult to say where the line between the state and its societal environment actually runs. It almost seems as if the constant movement of the line and the uncertainty that is connected with it can themselves constitute a mode of rule (cf. Chabal/Daloz 1998).

Law. As with state/society and public/private, a similar dichotomy on which the state's image is built upon is legal/illegal. Law involves the creation of sanctions, structuring society in a way that non-state actors' engagement with the state and with each other reinforces the image of the state; in this way too, law stabilizes power relations, creating institutionalized domination. Popular morality is always in tension with state law, even though all that state law, to some degree, is built on and integrates such morality, especially in common law systems. In Hegel's terms, morality (*Moralität*), as opposed to the reflected form of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), is epitomized in the Law. The imposition of the state's legal system is therefore always to some extent challenged by competing sets of everyday moral rules. This tension is not only found in social movements against particular state policies, it can also be found in strategies of state officials themselves, who might put their particular understanding of the purpose and opportunities of their position above the formal rules of the state.

The reshaping of the boundary between the legal and the illegal can affect the use of violence, what Weber saw as the *sine qua non* of the ideal-typical state. The privatization of violence in post-Soviet Russia is telling in this regard. Here, too, lines are fluid and moving. Racketeer groups of criminal origin as well as security companies built up by former state security personnel overtook essential state functions, as the enforcement of contracts between business partners and the protection from other racketeers could no longer be guaranteed by the state. The movement of boundaries has been considerable: First, the state accepted, at least tacitly, the formation of these competing associations, thus withdrawing from certain areas and allowing forms of organization to evolve and to operate that were formerly considered illegal. Second, some of these gangster-like racketeer groups transformed into investing companies that are also active in the political arena by supporting particular politicians (Volkov 2000). To some extent, one could argue, the former pretence of monopolization of violence has become undone; the former

criminal gang has become a recognized, if not necessarily legal, entity, not clearly distinguishable from the state.

The state and its interior. Most of the boundaries above refer to dualities; they demarcate a distinction between the state and something else. The movement of boundaries that result from the tension between the image of the state and actual practices can also affect the inner logic of the state. As any analysis of a *coup d'état* makes clear, the relation, for example, between the civilian and the military part of the state is also moving. Power struggles within the state are ubiquitous. Partly, the reason for the continuing reconfiguration of the state itself stems from divergent ideas of how to mould a state; partly, from changing alliances of state agents with agents of other societal groups and associations. The military is certainly the institution that – due to its relatively closed character – is most prone to the development of a particular e*sprit de corps*, which both encompasses the image of the state in general and the particular role of the military therein. But, as Tom Lewis's contribution clearly shows, jurists too tend to develop their own understanding of what the state should be and do. The effects of these struggles among the agencies of a state can hardly be overestimated.

Also, the dynamic at work in Lewis's case of the 'judicialization of politics' in Mexico should not be reduced simply to internal or domestic changes. International political pressure, professional ideas obtained during studies abroad, the spread of knowledge about developments elsewhere, all these contribute to a closer relation between local events and the rhetoric and keywords of global agendas. Numerous agencies straddle state boundaries; their strategies and worldviews stem from intermingled traditions and experiences that are not constituted within single 'national' realms.

State Formation in an International Space

State dynamics, in any given case, stem from the interaction of state officials with societal forces, as political and social actors try to shape the field of power. But these domestic actors are not the only ones in this process. International actors play a significant role, too, in these fields of power, interacting with various state and societal forces, and thus helping shape the field of power and state dynamics. As in European history, where international forces contributed to state formation – and state decay – states in the twentieth century were formed in an environment replete with interventionist global forces, as are states in the twenty-first.

The three primary waves of state creation in the twentieth century – following World War I, World War II, and the collapse of the Soviet Union – all involved intense international involvement in the shaping of relations between the new states and their societies. Leaders of new states that were born in the wake of the crumbling of empires in World War I or the disintegration of colonial empires after World War II were profoundly aware of the uncertain environment into which these states emerged and how attentive they had to be to intrusive international

factors. They faced not only avaricious neighbours, but new international agencies, corporations, and other transnational forces that impinged on their everyday decisions.

In the 1990s, these mostly still-fragile states and new ones that emerged in southeastern Europe, central Asia, and elsewhere encountered a now even more complex international environment, as Western powers and international organizations were more likely than ever to intervene directly in these states. Moreover, the stability of borders that marked the Cold War, at least after the disintegration of the colonial empires, gave way to a period in which states, such as Yugoslavia, simply disappeared and others, such as Liberia, became playgrounds for multiple outside armies. Also, 'state-building' and 'nation-building' came to be explicit goals of Western powers, although the actual experiences in attempting to change state dynamics and state-society relations usually ended badly.

A number of cases of international intervention, such as Bosnia or Kosovo, have produced what some authors label as 'protectorates' (Pugh 2003). In other instances, such as Mozambique or Uganda, the weaving of practices by local societies, governments, and international agencies has produced settings far from the image of the state as a coherent, unified actor. International financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have fashioned the general direction of economic policy. At the same time, bilateral donors engaged in conditional lending, moulding still other fields of policy. And a gaggle of non-state agencies and private companies has assumed everyday functions, including education and health, which were considered state activities in the standard image of the state.[17]

The sheer numbers of international actors involved in the local field of power have affected state dynamics and the relationship of states to their societies. Beyond the numbers, these international forces have introduced their own interests and goals into the mix, making state-society relations increasingly complex. Whether those interests have been narrowly defined or have involved grand international visions, such as 'peace' and 'development', they have provided an endless source of motivation for international actors to continue participating in local fields of power, deeply affecting state formation. There is always something for international actors to fix, always a plan that the international community should contribute something to, and always something that goes wrong and needs fixing through further intervention and programs. Global discourses on development, democratization, human rights, peace and more have become the code for institutionalized involvement of all kinds of externally-rooted agencies that shape states on all continents.

This involvement places international forces squarely into the complex shaping of relations between states and their societies. This mix of powerful forces is not only problematic for domestic actors; it can lead outside states and agencies into difficult areas, as well. International actors have come to be caught in a moral vice

[17] See also Chapter 7 on Uganda in this volume.

as states 'expropriate', in Weber's terms, functions from other social groups, as they 'break the hold of existing groups', often through the use or threat of violence (Ottaway 2002: 1015). Outside powers and agencies have often aimed to help institutionalize states in some conflict-free manner but end up in the midst of violent internal battles or repressive state practices.

Some sorts of outside intervention, from full-scale invasion to 'peace-keeping', involve violence. But even forms of intervention that appear totally peaceful and benign may involve the international force in violence. Various forms of social engineering, at the heart of so many examples of intervention, come to be connected to the local dynamics of violence. As outsiders, international actors find it extremely difficult to gain legitimacy in the local setting and discover that, as they become associated with the violence of the state, that gaining local acceptance becomes nearly impossible. Violent means need a much longer time to be transformed into legitimate rule, because violence creates resentments that are not easy to overcome. The long shadow of coercive colonial rule that made it so hard for post-colonial states to gain legitimacy (cf. Mbembe 2000) confirms this experience.

In short, the complexity of local state dynamics, the addition of international agencies' (and their workers') own interests into the mix and the difficulty for outsiders of achieving broad acceptance as they ally with states using violence all speak to the near impossibility of international intervention actually achieving the stated goals. The image of what the local state should be might survive, but international actors may only widen the gap between that image and actual practices. Together with domestic state and social forces, these outsiders internationalize state formation and contribute to the shaping of states that are far from what these outsiders imagined they would be.

Conclusion: Towards a New International Political Sociology

There are no indications that the state as a political form will vanish soon. Popular discourse will continue to portray the world map as, first and foremost, divided into territorial states. In fact, the image of the state in popular imagination may be at an all time high, certainly much more pervasive and persistent than many recent scholarly works have suggested. This volume insists on keeping the state at the centre of academic debates, as well. Beyond that simple but important message, the articles that follow also point to the adaptability of states, their diversity, and their persistence at a time that scholarly work has either schematized the state or pushed it to the margins in the face of globalization. The approach presented here prompts researchers to broaden their view, without *a priori* excluding relevant phenomena, to include processes that shape the actual forms of statehood. By contrasting image and practices, it is now possible to take the particularity of singular processes (Bayart's *trajectoires*) into account without falling into the traps of historical or cultural relativism.

The view presented here also leaves room for a fruitful variety of interpretations. As it turns out, many elements that first look like parts of a story of state decay and disintegration may actually be part of processes that lead to a reconfiguration of state domination. The states, as well as their surroundings, are replete with ambiguities. But it is possible to discern the meaning of these ambiguous turns of events only if the view of the state is not prefigured by an orientation towards the Western experience and its stylized image of Weber's legal-rational rule by a centralized, bureaucratic state. The vectors of forces that shape contemporary states cannot fully be revealed through the system of coordinates that previous understandings of the state employed.

The proposed conception should also allow scholars to see common metaphors associated with today's states – privatization, criminalization, democratization, shadow state, state collapse, and others – in a different light. First, the emphasis on a field of power in our conception avoids the static character of political theories and approaches that too often forget or neglect the conflictual character of political relations within and around the state. Second, our differentiation between image and practices facilitates bringing the ambiguities and contradictions of state domination to the fore. For example, it is possible that the image of the state can persist through long periods in which practices contradict that image. Most observers would call that 'state decay'. But the very same practices that seemingly subvert the image of the state can be incorporated into the state's institutions and its overall pattern of domination.

The conception of the state used here grew out of the discussions among the authors in this volume; not surprisingly, then, it fits the cases in the book, mostly from non-OECD regions, quite well. The conception, however, should work for contemporary Western states, as well. In the West, too, states have been experiencing tremendous change. Programs of privatization; the reshaping of social security systems; the '*décharge*' of the state in the field of policing; the administration of prisons by private, barely regulated firms; and other recent phenomena, all suggest that there is a yawning gap between the image of the state and the actual practices in the West. The gap might differ in kind and magnitude from the cases presented here, but the gap is real. In Western states, too, boundaries between legal and illegal, public and private, state and society are unstable and moving. As in our cases, these spheres are constantly reconstructed.

Indeed, it would be fascinating to compare some Western cases with others, something that is rarely done. One conclusion from such comparisons might well be that the differences of context and of forms do not allow all-encompassing assertions about the future of statehood – the forms of domination, the persistence of states, the nature of the dynamics between image and practice. A second possible conclusion is that the main lines of the future of states, of the image and of the practices, may not easily be determined because the differences of constellations are simply too big. Third, such comparisons are necessary to gain some purchase on changes in the image of the state. Unlike practices, the prevailing image of the state is fairly constant from state to state; the image is not

simply dependent on local practice but has a world-historical context. By comparing the events in the West, such as the growth of the European Union, with those elsewhere, such as the breakdown of personal security in parts of West Africa, it is possible to begin to understand how the image of the state is changing globally. To be sure, state image changes far more slowly than do state practices, but the combination of local and global practices certainly does change the image of the state across the globe.

The approach here, then, does not discount the importance of global phenomena and globalization; rather it insists on seeing the dynamics of states as key elements in understanding new global processes. The growing importance of allegiances that straddle state boundaries (cf. Badie/Birnbaum 1994) and the spread of organizational forms that are all too easily summarized as 'global civil society' need to be understood much better in order to assess the future developments of state domination. These new international forms of political organization do not necessarily stand in contradiction with the form of statehood. Exiled groups still mobilize for support of political projects that concern states, even if these states exist, as in the case of Kurds, only in people's imagination. Networks of families that live in different countries or even continents use the differences between states, in terms of services, opportunities, and rights available, in order to maximize their security, wealth and income – just as multinational corporations do. But the activities of both multinational families and corporations need not undermine states. Their practices, rather, often are incorporated into the field of power that makes up the state, producing new forms of state domination.

The approach suggested here, we hope, opens multiple new avenues for research. A new political sociology of the state needs to focus on the multiplicity of state forms and begin to categorize them. It has to take account of the dynamic between image and particular practices, especially those that run counter to the world image of the state. The new political sociology, too, must not be bound by the state territorial boundaries printed on world political maps; it must be an international political sociology that accounts for transnational, regional, and global practices and their impact both on local state dynamics and on the prevailing world image of what states are.

References

Abélès, Marc (1991), *Anthropologie de l'Etat*, Paris.

Amin, Samir (1976), *Unequal Development*, Sussex.

Apter, David E. (1965), *The politics of modernization*, Chicago.

Ariès, Philippe (1991), 'Einleitung zu einer Geschichte des privaten Lebens', in Ariès, Ph. / Duby, Georges (eds) *Geschichte des privaten Lebens, Bd. 3, Von der Renaissance zur Aufklärung*, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 7–20.

Badie, Bertrand / Birnbaum, Pierre (1994), 'Sociology of the state revisited', in *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 46(2), pp. 153–167.

Bayart, Jean-François (1996), 'L'historicité de l'Etat importé', in Bayart (ed.) 1996 *La greffe de l'Etat, Les trajectoires du politique*, no. 2, Paris, pp. 11–39.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1985), 'The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups', in *Theory and Society*, vol. 14(6), pp. 723–744.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1997), 'De la maison du roi à la raison d'Etat', in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, no. 118, June 1997, pp. 55–68.

Burchell, Graham / Gordon, Colin / Miller, Peter (eds) (1991), *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago.

Cassirer, Ernst (1988), *Der Mythos des Staates. Philosophische Grundlagen politischen Verhaltens*, (first ed. 1944, New York), Frankfurt am Main.

Certeau, Michel de (1984), *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley.

Chabal, Patrick / Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1998), *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument*, London.

Chirot, Daniel (1997), *Essential outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the modern transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe*, Seattle.

Cover, Robert (1993), 'Nomos and Narrative', in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Sutin Srat, (eds), *Narrative Violence and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover*, Ann Arbor.

Cramer, Christopher / Goodhand, Jonathan (2002), 'Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the "Post-Conflict" Challenge in Afghanistan', in *Development and Change*, vol. 33(5), pp. 885–909.

Cumings, Bruce (1999), 'Webs with no Spiders, Spiders with No Webs: The Genealogy of the Developmental State', in Woo-Cummings, Meredith (ed.) *The Developmental State*, Ithaca, New York, pp. 61–92.

Dunn, John (1995), *Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?*, Cambridge, Mass.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (1973), 'Traditional patrimonialism and modern neo-patrimonialism', *Sage Research Paper*, Beverly Hills and London.

Elias, Norbert (1969), 'Die höfische Gesellschaft: Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Königtums und der höfischen Aristokratie', Darmstadt.

Elias, Norbert (1977), 'Zur Grundlegung einer Theorie sozialer Prozesse', in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 6(2), pp. 127–149.

Evans, Peter B. (1979), *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*, New York.

Evans, Peter B. (1995), *Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton.

Evans, Peter B. / Rauch, James E. (1999), 'Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth', in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 64(3), pp. 748–765.

Evans, Peter B. /Rueschemeyer, Dietrich / Skocpol, Theda (eds) (1985), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge.

Fernandes, Lela (1997), *Producing Workers: The Politics of Gender, Class, and Culture in the Calcutta Jute Mills*, Philadelphia, Penn.

Foucault, Michel (1991), *On Governmentality*, in Burchell et al. (eds), pp. 32–119.

Frank, André Gunder (1967), 'Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America', New York.

Goudsblom, Johan / Mennell, Stephen (eds) (1998), *The Norbert Elias Reader*, Oxford.

Gupta, Akhil (1995), 'Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State', in *American Ethnologist*, vol. 22(2), pp. 375–402.

Habermas, Jürgen (1962), *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Darmstadt.

Hibou, Béatrice (ed.) (1999), *La privatisation des Etats*, Paris.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. / Ranger, Terence O. (eds) (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge.

Hyden, Göran (1983), *No Shortcuts to Progress. African Development Management in Perspective*, Berkeley.

Jellinek, Georg (1920), *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 3rd ed., Berlin.

Koselleck, Reinhardt (1989), *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt am Main.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1999), *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton NJ.

Krippendorff, Ekkehart (1986), *Internationale Politik. Geschichte und Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main.

Laidi, Zaki (1998), 'Le temps mondial', in Marie-Claude Smouts (ed.) *Les nouvelles relations internationales. Pratiques et théories*, Paris, pp. 183–202.

Lerner, Daniel (1958), *The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernizing the Middle East*, New York.

Luhmann, Niklas (1984), *Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie*, Frankfurt am Main.

Lustick, Ian S. (1993), *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*, Ithaca, New York.

Lüthy, Herbert (1967), 'Die Epoche der Kolonisation und die Erschließung der Erde. Versuch einer Interpretation des europäischen Zeitalters', in Herbert Lüthy, *In Gegenwart der Geschichte. Historische Essays*, Cologne, pp. 179–270.

MacGaffey, Janet et al. (1991), *The Real Economy of Zaire. The Contributions of Smuggling and Other Unofficial Activities to National Wealth*, Philadelphia, Penn.

Maier, Charles (1987), 'The politics of time: changing paradigms of collective time and private time in the modern era', in C.S. Maier (ed.) *Changing boundaries of the political*, Cambridge, pp. 151–175.

Mbembe, Achille (2000), *De la postcolonie. Essai sur l'imagination politique dans l'Afrique contemporaine*, Paris.

Médard, Jean-François (1991), 'Etatisation et désétatisation en Afrique noire', in Médard (ed.) *Etats d'Afrique noire, Formations, mécanismes et crise*, Paris, pp. 323–354.

Meyer, John / Hannan, Michael T. (1979), *National Development in the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950–1970*, Chicago.

Migdal, Joel S. (2001), *State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Mass.

Modelski, George (1987), *Long Cycles in World Politics*, Seattle.

Münkler, Herfried (1994), *Politische Bilder, Politik der Metaphern*, Frankfurt am Main.

North, Douglass C. (1981), *Structure and Change in Economic History*, New York.

Ottaway, Marina (2002), 'Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States', in *Development and Change*, vol. 33(5), pp. 1001–1023.

Popitz, Heinrich (1986), *Phänomene der Macht. Autorität - Herrschaft - Gewalt - Technik*, Tübingen.

Pugh, Michael (2003), 'Protectorates and spoils of peace: political economy in south-east Europe', in Jung, Dietrich (ed.) *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars. A political economy of intra-state war*, London, pp. 47–69.

Reinhart, Wolfgang (ed.) (1999), *Verstaatlichung der Welt? Europäische Staatsmodelle und außereuropäische Machtprozesse*, München.

Roitman, Janet (1998), 'The Garrison-Entrepôt', in *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, vol. 38(150–152), pp. 297–330.

Rostow, Walt W. (1960), *The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto*, Cambridge.

Ruggie, John G. (1993), 'Territoriality and beyond', in *International Organization*, vol. 47(1), pp. 139–167.

Sassen, Saskia (1996), *Losing control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York.

Scharpf, Fritz W. (1991), 'Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts', in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 32(4), pp. 621–634.

Schlichte, Klaus (2000), 'Staatsbildung und Staatszerfall in der Dritten Welt', in K. Schlichte / J. Siegelberg (eds) *Strukturwandel internationaler Beziehungen. Zum Verhältnis von Staat und internationalem System seit dem Westfälischen Frieden*, Wiesbaden, pp. 260–280.

Senghaas, Dieter (ed.) (1972), *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion*, Frankfurt am Main.

Shils, Edward A. (1975), *Center and Periphery. Essays in Macrosociology*, Chicago – London.

Siegelberg, Jens (2000), 'Staat und internationales System: Ein strukturgeschichtlicher Überblick', in K. Schlichte /J. Siegelberg (eds) *Strukturwandel internationaler Beziehungen. Zum Verhältnis von Staat und internationalem System seit dem Westfälischen Frieden*, Wiesbaden, pp. 11–56.

Stobbe, Alfred (1983), *Mikroökonomik*, Berlin.
Trotha, Trutz von (1994), *Koloniale Herrschaft. Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des* "*Schutzgebietes Togo*", Tübingen.
Volkov, Vadim (2000), 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and in the Present', in *Social Research*, vol. 67(3), pp. 1–36.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York.
Weber, Max (1964), *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York.
Weber, Max (1968), *Economy and Society*, New York.
Weber, Max (1985), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie* (first ed. 1922), Tübingen.
Weber, Max (1988), *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (first ed. 1922), Tübingen.